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LAWYER LIABILITY AND THE VORTEX OF DEEPENING 
INSOLVENCY 
DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND,* REBECCA LAMBERTH** 
& AMBREEN DELAWALLA*** 
INTRODUCTION 
A prominent bankruptcy scholar once opined that “no ethical or rational 
lawyer should ever willingly represent an insolvent corporation outside 
bankruptcy,” an “absurdity” attributable to the fact that simply by representing 
an insolvent corporation, lawyers may incur liability to the client’s creditors.1  
Lawyers’ liability exposure is not created when a business client bottoms out 
in bankruptcy or receivership, but derives instead from the client’s spiraling 
descent.  When a corporation enters the zone of insolvency or becomes 
insolvent, its directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties expand to include 
creditors.2  The directors and officers are obligated to protect creditors’ 
financial interest in the company.3  If through fraud or other tortious conduct 
they prolong the company’s life beyond insolvency and harm the creditors by 
increasing the corporation’s debt or by dissipating its assets, liability may 
follow on a “deepening insolvency” theory.4  Some jurisdictions may deem the 
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Vanderbilt University. 
*** Associate, Alston & Bird in Atlanta, Georgia.  J.D., Columbia Law School; B.S., Duke 
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 1. Bruce A. Markell, The Folly of Representing Insolvent Corporations: Examining Lawyer 
Liability and Ethical Issues Involved in Extending Fiduciary Duties to Creditors, 6 J. BANKR. L. 
& PRAC. 403, 403 (1997). 
 2. Miller v. Dutil (In re Total Containment, Inc.), 335 B.R. 589, 603 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
2005); Kittay v. Atl. Bank of N.Y. (In re Global Serv. Group, LLC), 316 B.R. 451, 460 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 3. See Myron M. Sheinfeld & Judy H. Pippitt, Fiduciary Duties of Directors of a 
Corporation in the Vicinity of Insolvency and After Initiation of a Bankruptcy Case, 60 BUS. 
LAW. 79, 88–89 (2004) (discussing “trust fund” and “at risk” theories for imposing fiduciary 
duties on directors of insolvent corporations). 
 4. In re LTV Steel Co., Inc., 333 B.R. 397, 421–22 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) (stating that 
deepening insolvency liability can be predicated on negligence and explaining how fraudulently 
concealing and incurring debt causes harm). 
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corporation itself to be harmed by the actions of the directors and officers.5  
Deepening insolvency theory, as with the vortex of any corporate fraud, 
potentially sucks in the company’s lawyers via allegations that they aided and 
abetted the officers’ and directors’ breach of their fiduciary duties or that they 
conspired with them to accomplish their unlawful purposes. 
To be sure, a distressed company’s acquisition of additional debt, standing 
alone, is not unlawful.6  Merely prolonging an insolvent corporation’s 
existence is no basis for liability.7  Directors and officers of a distressed 
corporation have no blanket duty to seek bankruptcy protection or to liquidate 
the company for creditors’ immediate benefit.8  The fiduciaries of an insolvent 
business, or one that is nearly so, might reasonably conclude that operating 
through desperately lean times is required to create long-term value.9  That is 
often the case with start-up businesses; even many established businesses 
function in the zone of insolvency.10  A plaintiff proceeding on a deepening 
insolvency theory should therefore have to show that a defendant prolonged 
the company’s existence through the breach of a separate duty or the 
commission of an actionable tort.11  A plaintiff resting a deepening insolvency 
claim on fraud allegations must plead supporting facts with particularity.12  
 
 5. See, e.g., id. at 421 (explaining how deepening insolvency harms corporation); Ranalli v. 
Ferrari (In re Unifi Commc’ns, Inc.), 317 B.R. 13, 16–18 (D. Mass. 2004) (finding that 
bankruptcy trustee had standing to sue because deepening insolvency harmed debtor corporation 
itself); Hannover Corp. of Am. v. Beckner, 211 B.R. 849, 854 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1997) (noting 
“that the aggravation of insolvency or prolonging the life of an insolvent business has been 
considered to constitute injury to the corporation”). 
 6. Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater S.E. Cmty. Hosp. Corp.), 333 B.R. 506, 530 (Bankr. 
D.D.C. 2005). 
 7. Limor v. Buerger (In re Del-Met Corp.), 322 B.R. 781, 813 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2005); 
In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 458. 
 8. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of RSL COM PRIMECALL, Inc. v. Beckhoff 
(In re RSL COM PRIMECALL, Inc.), Nos. 01-11457 through 01-11469(ALG), Adv. No. 03-
2176(ALG), 2003 WL 22989669, at *8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2003). 
 9. In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 460; see also Tabas v. Greenleaf Ventures, Inc. (In 
re Flagship Healthcare, Inc.), 269 B.R. 721, 728 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001) (observing that “it is not 
uncommon for a corporation to revitalize itself and work out financial problems no matter how 
dire they appear”). 
 10. See Robert R. Keatinge, Lawyers’ Liabilities in Representing Troubled Organizational 
Clients, Speech at Ass’n of Prof’l Responsibility Lawyers Mid-Year Meeting (Feb. 10, 2006) 
(“Lots of companies are in the vicinity of insolvency or zone of insolvency.”). 
 11. Devon Mobile Commc’ns Liquidating Trust v. Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. (In re 
Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.), No. 02-41729, Adv. No. 04-03192, 2006 WL 687153, at *16–18 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2006); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec Telecom, Inc. 
v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. (In re Vartec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 644 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
2005); In re Greater S.E. Cmty. Hosp. Corp., 333 B.R. at 516; In re Del-Met Corp., 322 B.R. at 
813; In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 458. 
 12. See Corp. Aviation Concepts, Inc. v. Multi-Service Aviation Corp., No. Civ. A. 03-3020, 
2004 WL 1900001, at *3–4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2004) (dismissing deepening insolvency claim 
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Generally speaking, however, deepening insolvency theory is not clearly 
defined or limited.13  As the court in Smith v. Arthur Andersen LLP14 observed, 
“it is difficult to grasp exactly what the theory entails.”15  Or, as one corporate 
law scholar recently noted, “[i]t is very difficult right now to know what the 
law is [in this area].”16 
Several aspects of deepening insolvency theory are especially 
disconcerting for lawyers.  For example, deepening insolvency theory seeks to 
hold lawyers representing a distressed corporation liable to non-clients 
(corporate creditors), to whom they otherwise owe no duties, and whose 
interests may conflict with the client.17  If a lawyer represents both the 
corporation and an insider—a common joint representation—she may face 
additional liability attributable to her multiple roles.  Lawyers may not be able 
to avoid problems or cure conflicts of interest by withdrawing from an 
insolvent client’s representation because of timing issues or because the client 
will be unable to secure new counsel given the decreased prospect of payment. 
Furthermore, even baseless deepening insolvency claims are expensive to 
defend and may harm a law firm’s reputation.  To the extent that representing 
financially infirm companies is seen as “foolhardy,” or the associated risks are 
perceived to be “too high for any ethical or rational lawyer,”18 deepening 
insolvency theory has the undesirable effect of discouraging good lawyers 
from representing clients that would benefit from their advice.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that many lawyers perceive representing financially troubled 
companies outside of bankruptcy to be a “really frightening area of the law.”19 
This article explores the contours of deepening insolvency theory as it 
applies to lawyers.  Section I examines the history of deepening insolvency 
 
because plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege fraud); Nisselson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Monahan 
Ford Corp. of Flushing), 340 B.R. 1, 40 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that because deepening 
insolvency claim rested on the defendants’ exploitation and looting of the debtor, the underlying 
fraud allegations had to be pleaded with particularity); In re RSL COM PRIMECALL, 2003 WL 
22989669, at *6–7 (discussing constructive fraud allegations forming basis for deepening 
insolvency claim). 
 13. Jo Ann J. Brighton, Deepening Insolvency, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2004, at 34, 79; 
see also Paul Rubin, New Liability Under “Deepening Insolvency”, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 
2004, at 50, 69 (noting confusion surrounding elements of deepening insolvency as a cause of 
action and observing that it is unclear how deepening insolvency damages should be measured). 
 14. 421 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 15. Id. at 1003–04. 
 16. Ann E. Conaway, Professor, Widener University School of Law, Lawyers’ Liabilities in 
Representing Troubled Organizational Clients, Speech at Ass’n of Prof’l Responsibility Lawyers 
Mid-Year Meeting (Feb. 10, 2006). 
 17. See Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Sherwood Partners, Inc., 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325, 342–45 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining that under California law lawyers do not owe duties to clients’ 
creditors and should not be held to owe duties to third parties adverse to the lawyer’s client). 
 18. Markell, supra note 1, at 428. 
 19. Conaway, supra note 16. 
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litigation.  It discusses deepening insolvency as a theory of damages and as an 
independent cause of action.  Section II probes the elements of deepening 
insolvency claims.  Among other things, we contend that deepening 
insolvency, if anything more than a catch phrase, is at most and only rarely a 
viable damages theory; we argue that deepening insolvency cannot constitute 
an independent cause of action; we examine the role of the business judgment 
rule as a defense in deepening insolvency litigation; and we discuss causation, 
foreseeability, and damages in deepening insolvency cases.  Finally, Section III 
offers lawyers practical advice on avoiding liability in deepening insolvency 
cases. 
I.  BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
“Deepening insolvency,” whether expressing an independent tort or a 
theory of damages, is a matter of state law; it is not a creature of the 
bankruptcy code or other federal law.20  To the extent the theory is discussed 
by federal courts, that discussion most often occurs in the context of predicting 
whether a state’s highest court would adopt the theory as a new cause of 
action, or whether it would recognize it as a measure of damages.21  Deepening 
insolvency theory traces back to Bloor v. Dansker (In re Investors Funding 
Corp. of New York Securities Litigation),22 in which a bankruptcy trustee 
alleged that the corporate debtor’s insiders looted the corporation and, as part 
of their scheme, artificially prolonged the corporation’s existence to mask their 
past misdeeds and to raise new capital to steal.23  In defending against the 
trustee’s allegations that it aided and abetted the insiders’ fraud, the debtor’s 
accounting firm raised the adverse inference exception to the general rule that 
an agent’s knowledge is imputed to her principal.24  Addressing this aspect of 
agency law, the Bloor court stated: “A corporation is not a biological entity for 
which it can be presumed that any act which extends its existence is beneficial 
to it.”25  Because the insiders’ artificial extension of the debtor’s solvency 
benefited only them and their confederates and not the corporation, which 
continued to deteriorate financially as their scheme went on, the court declined 
to impute the insiders’ knowledge to the corporation.26 
The Bloor court could have foregone discussion of the debtor’s “deepening 
insolvency” and still have decided the case in the trustee’s favor.  The court’s 
 
 20. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec Telecom, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. 
(In re Vartec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 638 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005). 
 21. See id. at 638–39 (mentioning only the recognition of a new cause of action). 
 22. 523 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
 23. Id. at 541. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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discussion of the subject is therefore dicta.27  What began as dicta in a portion 
of a district court opinion discussing a point of agency law, however, 
developed into much more.  Deepening insolvency claims have become 
standard in lawsuits brought by government regulators arising out of the failure 
of financial institutions and insurance companies.28  The thrust in these cases is 
that by fraudulently creating the appearance that the institution or insurer was 
solvent, the defendants prevented authorities from timely placing the entity 
into receivership.29 
Deepening insolvency claims are now common in lawsuits by bankruptcy 
trustees and other private litigants arising out of business failures.30  The 
implication in these cases is that had the defendants not falsely created the 
impression that the company was solvent, the shareholders would have 
dissolved it when they could still salvage their investments, or that creditors 
could have involuntarily placed the company into bankruptcy before its assets 
were dissipated. 
Not all courts recognize deepening insolvency theory.31  Many courts do 
recognize it, however, and treat deepening insolvency allegations in one of two 
ways.  First, some courts treat deepening insolvency as a theory of damages.32  
 
 27. See Sarnoff v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984) (defining 
dictum as “a statement in a judicial opinion that could have been deleted without seriously 
impairing the analytical foundations of the holding”). 
 28. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Ins. v. Chase Bank of Tex. Nat’l Ass’n, 274 F.3d 924, 935 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (discussing deepening insolvency in this context); Corcoran v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 
545 N.Y.S.2d 278, 283–84 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
 29. Fla. Dep’t of Ins., 274 F.3d at 935. 
 30. See Sabin Willett, The Shallows of Deepening Insolvency, 60 BUS. LAW. 549, 549 (2005) 
(referring to bankruptcy trustees and administrators of bankruptcy estates, and identifying some 
potential defendants). 
 31. See, e.g., Bondi v. Bank of Am. Corp. (In re Parmalat), 383 F. Supp. 2d 587, 601–02 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (declining to recognize deepening insolvency as a cause of action under North 
Carolina law); Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater S.E. Cmty. Hosp. Corp.), 333 B.R. 506, 517 (Bankr. 
D.D.C. 2005) (rejecting deepening insolvency theory as duplicative of other claims); Official 
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec Telecom, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. (In re Vartec 
Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 641–46 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (rejecting theory under Texas 
law); Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, LLP, C.A. No. 1571-N, 2006 WL 2434228, at 
*28–30 (Del. Ch. Aug. 10, 2006) (rejecting deepening insolvency theory in any form); Bondi v. 
Citigroup, Inc., No. BER-L-10902-04, 2005 WL 975856, at *21 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 
28, 2005) (declining to recognize deepening insolvency as a theory of liability); Coroles v. Sabey, 
79 P.3d. 974, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (declining to recognize deepening insolvency as a 
damage theory). 
 32. See, e.g., Bondi v. Grant Thornton Int’l (In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.), 377 F. Supp. 2d 390, 
419 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing Illinois law); Bookland of Me. v. Baker, Newman & Noyes, 
LLC, 271 F. Supp. 2d 324, 325–26, 332, 326 n.5 (D. Me. 2003) (leaving open possibility that 
court might ultimately certify deepening insolvency issue to the Supreme Court of Maine); 
Rafool v. Goldfarb Corp. (In re Fleming Packaging Corp.), 336 B.R. 398, 401 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 
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Damages are measured by the failed corporation’s increased debt or by the 
dissipation of its assets after the time it became insolvent.  Second, other 
jurisdictions recognize deepening insolvency as an independent cause of 
action.33 
A. Deepening Insolvency as a Theory of Damages 
The Seventh Circuit energized deepening insolvency as a theory of 
damages in Schacht v. Brown.34  In that case, the Illinois Director of Insurance, 
acting as the liquidator of Reserve Insurance Company, alleged that the 
defendants carried out a fraudulent scheme in which Reserve’s corporate 
parent continued Reserve’s business even though the insurer was insolvent.  
This saddled Reserve with additional liabilities and drove it deeper into 
insolvency damaging Reserve, its policyholders, and its creditors in an amount 
exceeding $100 million.35  Had the Illinois Department of Insurance known 
that Reserve was insolvent, the Director alleged, it would have prevented 
Reserve from continuing to write insurance and would have acted to prevent 
the further dissipation of the company’s assets.36 
The defendants challenged the Director’s standing to sue on Reserve’s 
behalf, arguing that “a corporation may never sue to recover damages alleged 
to have resulted from the artificial prolongation of an insolvent corporation’s 
life.”37  The Schacht court disagreed.  First, the alleged harm to Reserve 
stemmed not only from the extension of its normal business operations, but 
from specific actions in connection with the extension that crippled the 
company.38  Beyond allowing Reserve’s assets to be dissipated by its normal 
business operations, the defendants allegedly siphoned millions of dollars out 
of the company and drained it of its most profitable and least risky business, 
 
2006) (attempting to predict Delaware law); Tabas v. Greenleaf Ventures, Inc. (In re Flagship 
Healthcare, Inc.), 269 B.R. 721, 728 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001). 
 33. See, e.g., Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assocs., P.C. (In re CitX Corp.), 448 F.3d 672, 
677 (3d Cir. 2006); Smith v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 421 F.3d 989, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 2005); Rahl 
v. Bande, 328 B.R. 387, 416–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);  Nisselson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Monahan 
Ford Corp. of Flushing), 340 B.R. 1, 39–40 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006); OHC Liquidation Trust v. 
Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Oakwood Homes Corp.), 340 B.R. 510, 527–31 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2006); In re LTV Steel Co., Inc., 333 B.R. 397, 421–22 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005); Limor v. 
Buerger (In re Del-Met Corp.), 322 B.R. 781, 811–15 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2005); Miller v. Dutil 
(In re Total Containment, Inc.), 335 B.R. 589, 619–20 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005); Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Exide Techs., Inc.), 299 B.R. 732, 750–
52 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003). 
 34. 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 35. Id. at 1345. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1349–50. 
 38. Id. at 1350. 
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thereby deepening its insolvency.39  In other words, the defendants’ “bleeding 
of Reserve” was part of a fraudulent scheme.40 
Second, the court rejected the suggestion “that the fraudulent prolongation 
of a corporation’s life beyond insolvency is automatically to be considered a 
benefit to the corporation’s interests.”41  That “premise collides with common 
sense” because a corporation descending ever deeper into insolvency “is 
ineluctably damaged” by its increasing obligations to creditors.42  As the court 
further explained: 
Indeed, in most cases, it would be crucial that the insolvency of the corporation 
be disclosed, so that shareholders may exercise their right to dissolve the 
corporation in order to cut their losses. . . . Thus, acceptance of a rule which 
would bar a corporation from recovering damages due to the hiding of 
information concerning its insolvency would create perverse incentives for 
wrong-doing officers and directors to conceal the true financial condition of 
the corporation from the corporate body as long as possible.43 
Several courts have followed Schacht,44 even when the recognition of 
deepening insolvency as a theory of damages is counterintuitive, as was the 
case in Allard v. Arthur Andersen & Co.45  Allard was the bankruptcy trustee 
for DeLorean Motor Company (DMC).46  He sued DMC’s former auditors, 
Arthur Andersen & Company (Andersen), for malpractice, negligence, breach 
of contract, unjust enrichment, fraud, aiding and abetting fraud and/or breach 
of fiduciary duty, securities fraud, aiding and abetting securities fraud, RICO 
violations, aiding and abetting RICO violations, and violating a Michigan 
statute.47  Among other things, the trustee sought damages based on DMC’s 
indebtedness to trade creditors.48  Moving for summary judgment, Andersen 
argued that the trustee could not recover such damages because “DMC could 
not conceivably have been damaged by further indebtedness because the 
indebtedness provided a benefit—more capital—to the company.”49  
 
 39. Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1350. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See, e.g., Hannover Corp. of Am. v. Beckner, 211 B.R. 849, 854 (M.D. La. 1997) (citing 
Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1347–48 (7th Cir. 1983)); In re LTV Steel Co., 333 B.R. 397, 
422 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) (quoting Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1983)); 
In re Latin Inv. Corp., 168 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr. D.C. 1993) (quoting Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 
1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1983)). 
 45. 924 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 46. Id. at 490. 
 47. Id. at 491. 
 48. See id. at 494. 
 49. Id. at 494. 
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Acknowledging that Andersen’s argument was “intuitively appealing,” the 
court nonetheless rejected it, relying on Schacht.50 
The Allard court observed that credit may be an illusory financial cushion 
“that lulls shareholders into postponing the decision to dissolve a corporation” 
before management can squander the company’s remaining resources, such 
that the infusion of capital from creditors does not necessarily benefit a 
distressed corporation.51  Furthermore, Andersen’s principal attack on the 
trustee’s “deepening insolvency” theory was that it was not legally recognized; 
Andersen did not attack the factual basis for the theory in the case at hand.52  
The court reasoned that “because courts have permitted recovery on a 
‘deepening insolvency’ theory,” Andersen was not entitled to summary 
judgment on any portion of the trustee’s case representing damages attributable 
to DMC’s indebtedness to trade creditors.53 
Allard should be afforded little weight.  First, one of the two cases 
permitting recovery for deepening to which insolvency the Allard court 
referred in rejecting the defendant’s arguments was Bloor v. Dansker (In re 
Investors Funding Corp. of New York Securities Litigation).54  As noted 
previously, the discussion in Bloor supposedly advocating deepening 
insolvency theory was dicta.55  Second, the Allard court was persuaded by the 
fact that other courts recognized deepening insolvency theory and, 
conjunctively, that no cases appeared to have explicitly rejected the theory.56  
That basis for decision no longer exists.  There are now a number of cases 
rejecting deepening insolvency claims.57  Third, Andersen offered no facts to 
 
 50. Allard, 924 F. Supp. at 494. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. (quoting In re Investors Funding Corp. of N.Y. Sec. Litig., 523 F. Supp. 533, 541 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980)). 
 55. See In re Investors Funding Corp., 523 F. Supp. 533; supra text accompanying notes 
22–26. 
 56. See Allard, 924 F. Supp. at 494. 
 57. See, e.g., Askanase v. Fatjo, No. Civ. A. H-91-3140, 1996 WL 33373364, at *28 (S.D. 
Tex. Apr. 1, 1996) (rejecting trustee’s deepening insolvency argument because the insolvent 
debtor was not damaged by the false financial statements, since the shareholders had already lost 
all of their equity and there was no allegation of harm to creditors); Fla. Dep’t of Ins. v. Chase 
Bank of Tex. Nat’l Ass’n, 274 F.3d 924, 935–36 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the plaintiff had 
presented no evidence of additional debt incurred by an insolvent insurer and, thus, no evidence 
of damages); In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 383 F. Supp. 2d 587, 601–02 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(discussing North Carolina law); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec Telecom, Inc. 
v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. (In re Vartec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 646 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) 
(rejecting deepening insolvency theory as duplicating torts established under Texas law); Kittay 
v. Atl. Bank of N.Y. (In re Global Serv. Group, LLC), 316 B.R. 451, 456–61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2004); Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, LLP, C.A. No. 1571-N, 2006 WL 2434228, 
at *28–30 (Del. Ch. Aug. 10, 2006); Coroles v. Sabey, 79 P.3d 974, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
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support its argument against deepening insolvency damages.  The trustee 
apparently refused to answer interrogatories that might have provided 
Andersen with ammunition for its argument, but it never sought to compel the 
trustee’s responses.58  Although experienced litigators can appreciate how such 
things happen, this failure is glaring because the trustee offered no specific 
evidence supporting his deepening insolvency theory.59  Had Andersen better 
prepared its defense, the case might have turned out differently. 
Finally, there is generally no merit in the Allard court’s position that 
further indebtedness may create an illusory financial cushion that lulls 
creditors into a false sense of security.  This is easily illustrated by way of 
example.  Consider a company with no cash and $1 million in debt that 
borrows an additional $1 million.  The company now has $1 million in cash 
and $2 million in debt.  The company’s degree of insolvency, however, is 
unchanged.  The creditors remain able to judge the wisdom of allowing the 
company to operate at that particular level of insolvency.  There is, in short, no 
way that a company’s mere borrowing should lull creditors into a false sense of 
security.60 
B. Deepening Insolvency as an Independent Cause of Action 
Deepening insolvency may be more than a theory of damages.  Plaintiffs 
suing in connection with corporate meltdowns often allege that deepening 
insolvency theory is an independent cause of action.  Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.61 is generally considered the 
leading case on deepening insolvency as a cause of action. 
Lafferty arose out of the activities of the Shapiro family.62  The Shapiros 
allegedly operated Walnut Equipment Leasing Company and its wholly owned 
subsidiary, Equipment Leasing Corporation of America (ELCOA), as a Ponzi 
scheme.63  Cogen Skar, LLP (Cogen) served as accountants for the Shapiro 
family’s operations and R.F. Lafferty & Company (Lafferty) served as the 
family’s independent underwriters.64  Cogen and Lafferty allegedly conspired 
with the Shapiros “to render opinions replete with multiple fraudulent 
misstatements and material omissions concerning Walnut and ELCOA’s 
financial statements.”65  When the Shapiros’ scheme collapsed, Walnut and 
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ELCOA sought bankruptcy protection in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.66  The trustee in their case appointed an Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors (the Committee).67 
In February 1999, the Committee sued the Shapiros and various companies 
owned by them, Walnut’s and ELCOA’s officers and directors, Cogen, and 
Lafferty, alleging that the defendants “wrongfully expanded the debtors’ debt 
out of all proportion of their ability to repay and ultimately forced the debtors 
to seek bankruptcy protection.”68  The Committee also sued the Shapiros, 
Cogen, and Lafferty for federal securities law violations, common law fraud, 
negligent misrepresentation, mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duty, breach 
of contract, professional malpractice, and aiding and abetting breach of 
fiduciary duty.69  The defendants moved to dismiss.70  The district court 
dismissed the claims against Cogen and Lafferty under the doctrine of in pari 
delicto.71  The court denied the other defendants’ motions.72  The Committee 
then severed its claims against Cogen and Lafferty and appealed their 
dismissal.73  Cogen settled with the Committee, leaving Lafferty as the sole 
appellee.74 
On appeal, the Third Circuit was called upon to determine “whether the 
alleged theory of injury—’deepening insolvency’—[was] cognizable under 
Pennsylvania law,” no Pennsylvania appellate court having directly addressed 
the issue.75  The Lafferty court concluded that if presented with the issue, “the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would determine that ‘deepening insolvency’ 
may give rise to a cognizable injury.”76  As the court explained: 
First and foremost, the theory is essentially sound.  Under federal bankruptcy 
law, insolvency is a financial condition in which a corporation’s debts exceed 
the fair market value of its assets. . . . Even when a corporation is insolvent, its 
corporate property may have value.  The fraudulent and concealed incurrence 
of debt can damage that value in several ways.  For example, to the extent that 
bankruptcy is not already a certainty, the incurrence of debt can force an 
insolvent corporation into bankruptcy, thus inflicting legal and administrative 
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costs on the corporation. . . . When brought on by unwieldy debt, bankruptcy 
also creates operational limitations which hurt a corporation’s ability to run its 
business in a profitable manner. . . . Aside from causing actual bankruptcy, 
deepening insolvency can undermine a corporation’s relationships with its 
customers, suppliers, and employees.  The very threat of bankruptcy, brought 
about through fraudulent debt, can shake the confidence of parties dealing with 
the corporation, calling into question its ability to perform, thereby damaging 
the corporation’s assets, the value of which often depends on the performance 
of other parties. . . . In addition, prolonging an insolvent corporation’s life 
through bad debt may simply cause the dissipation of corporate assets.  These 
harms can be averted, and the value within an insolvent corporation salvaged, 
if the corporation is dissolved in a timely manner, rather than kept afloat with 
spurious debt.77 
Moreover, in Pennsylvania, as in most jurisdictions, it is settled that 
“where there is an injury, the law provides a remedy.”78  The Lafferty court 
thus reasoned that where deepening insolvency damages a corporation’s 
property, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would provide a remedy by 
recognizing a cause of action for that injury.79 
The court ultimately concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
would “recognize ‘deepening insolvency’ as giving rise to a cognizable injury 
in the proper circumstances.”80  Unfortunately for the Committee, the court 
further concluded that the in pari delicto doctrine barred the Committee, which 
stood in the debtors’ shoes, from pursuing its claims against Lafferty.81  The 
Third Circuit thus affirmed the district court judgment.82 
Early on, the Lafferty court stated that “‘deepening insolvency’ constitutes 
a valid cause of action under Pennsylvania state law and that the Committee 
therefore had standing” to sue the many defendants.83  Beyond that isolated 
statement, however, it is difficult to understand why Lafferty is thought to be 
authority for recognizing deepening insolvency as a cause of action.  The 
Committee did not plead deepening insolvency as an independent cause of 
action; it pleaded federal securities law violations, common law fraud, 
negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, mismanagement and breach of 
fiduciary duty, professional malpractice, and aiding and abetting breach of 
fiduciary duty.84  The allegation of deepening insolvency that appears to be the 
centerpiece of the case—that the defendants “wrongfully expanded the 
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[d]ebtors’ debt out of all proportion of their ability to repay and ultimately 
forced the [d]ebtors to seek bankruptcy protection”—was apparently an 
allegation made within one of the pleaded causes of action.85  At most, then, 
the debtors’ deepening insolvency was either a fact supporting one or more of 
the Committee’s causes of action or it was an element of damage. 
Key passages of the opinion indicate that deepening insolvency should at 
most be an element of damage.  For example, after donning “the soothsayer’s 
garb” to predict how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rule, the Lafferty 
court wrote “that, if faced with the issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
would determine that ‘deepening insolvency’ may give rise to a cognizable 
injury.”86  That is as much a statement of damages theory as it is anything else. 
The court’s recognition of the “venerable principle[]” of Pennsylvania law 
that “where there is an injury, the law provides a remedy,”87 does not indicate 
otherwise.  The question for the court was whether an insolvent corporation is 
damaged if it becomes poorer still, i.e., whether deepening insolvency is an 
injury.  If so, the remedies the law provides already existed among the causes 
of action the Committee pleaded in its complaint.  The court went on to state 
that “an identifiable and compensable injury is essential to the existence of tort 
liability,” and that “where a contractual breach occurs, contract law seeks to 
give the nonbreaching party the benefit of his or her bargain, to put him or her 
in the position he or she would have been in had there been no breach.”88  
These statements clearly indicate that deepening insolvency is at most an 
element of damage.  With respect to the first, the court could just as easily have 
written, “identifiable damages are essential to the existence of tort liability,” 
and the second is a hornbook statement of contract damages. 
Finally, if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would recognize a deepening 
insolvency cause of action, what elements would it require a plaintiff to prove?  
Duty?  Breach?  Proximate cause?  Reasonable reliance?  Scienter?  The fact 
that these elements are nowhere explained in the opinion is compelling 
evidence that the Lafferty court’s early statement that “‘deepening insolvency’ 
constitutes a valid cause of action under Pennsylvania state law”89 was in fact 
an awkward expression of the court’s belief that under Pennsylvania law, a 
plaintiff suing in tort or for breach of contract may recover damages for a 
company’s deepening insolvency. 
In summary, a careful reading of Lafferty reveals little support for 
recognizing deepening insolvency as a cause of action.  Unfortunately, when 
recently given the chance to correct the problems with Lafferty or to retreat 
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from its holding another case involving allegations of deepening insolvency 
under Pennsylvania law, in In re CitX Corp., Inc.,90 the Third Circuit did not 
utilize that opportunity.  Instead, the court in In re CitX rather summarily 
reaffirmed that deepening insolvency is an independent cause of action under 
Pennsylvania law, albeit one linked only to fraud.91 
In In re CitX, an insolvent company operating a Ponzi scheme used its 
financial statements to lure investors.92  The company burned through the 
investors’ money, incurred millions more in debt, and filed for bankruptcy 
protection.93  The bankruptcy trustee sued the company’s accounting firm and 
the partner there responsible for compiling the financial statements for 
malpractice and “deepening insolvency.”94  The district court entered summary 
judgment for the defendants on both claims, and the trustee appealed.95  The 
Third Circuit affirmed the district court.96 
With respect to the malpractice claim, the trustee alleged that deepening 
insolvency was a theory of damages in that the defendants “dramatically 
deepened the insolvency of CitX, and wrongfully expanded the debt of CitX 
and waste of its illegally raised capital, by permitting CitX to incur additional 
debt” by compiling the fraudulent financial statements.97  The Third Circuit 
thus had to decide if deepening insolvency is a viable damage theory in 
negligence cases.98  Reviewing its decision in Lafferty, the court concluded that 
it was not a viable damage theory.99  Nothing in Lafferty, the court stated, 
should “be interpreted to create a novel theory of damages for an independent 
cause of action like malpractice.”100  The court further explained that it did not 
mean to imply by the quoted language that deepening insolvency was a valid 
theory of damages in connection with other causes of action, such as fraud.101 
As for deepening insolvency as an independent cause of action, the court 
held “that a claim of negligence cannot sustain a deepening-insolvency cause 
of action.”102  Deepening insolvency under Pennsylvania law requires 
fraudulent conduct on the defendants’ part.103  Unfortunately, the court in In re 
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CitX did not identify the elements of a fraud-based deepening insolvency 
claim. 
Lafferty and In re CitX aside, In re Exide Technologies, Inc.104 is another 
case plaintiffs often cite for the proposition that deepening insolvency is an 
independent cause of action.  Exide Technologies stemmed from events leading 
to the 2002 bankruptcy of the Exide Group (Exide).105  In 1997, various banks 
established a $650 million credit facility for Exide.106  In 2000, these same 
banks loaned Exide $250 million to acquire a competitor, GNB Dunlop.107  
Exide’s financial condition deteriorated rapidly after it acquired GNB 
Dunlop.108  In October 2001, the banks amended the loan documents in return 
for liens on all of Exide’s foreign subsidiaries’ assets and capital stock.109  In 
December 2001, the parties entered into a third amendment to their loan 
agreement that granted the banks additional collateral and guarantees, and did 
so in ways such that the transactions could not be challenged as preferential 
transfers under federal bankruptcy law.110  During the time that these 
amendments were being negotiated and executed, Exide suffered massive 
losses and allegedly became more insolvent.111 
The plaintiffs sued the lenders in January 2003.  In the twelfth count of 
their complaint, they pled a claim for deepening insolvency.112  The plaintiffs 
alleged that the banks caused Exide to acquire GNB Dunlop so that they could 
obtain the control necessary to force Exide to continue its business for nearly 
two years at ever increasing levels of insolvency.113  The banks’ conduct 
allegedly caused Exide “to suffer massive losses and become more deeply 
insolvent, costing creditors substantial value.”114  The banks moved to dismiss, 
asserting that deepening insolvency was not a recognized cause of action under 
Delaware law, that the plaintiffs did not allege that the banks had committed an 
actionable tort, that there was no allegation that the banks owed duties to Exide 
or its creditors, that the plaintiffs had not pleaded fraud with requisite 
particularity, and that the in pari delicto doctrine defeated the claim.115 
The Exide Technologies court first had to determine whether deepening 
insolvency was a valid claim under Delaware law.116  The court began its 
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analysis by noting that because the Delaware Supreme Court had not spoken 
on the tort of deepening insolvency, it would have to predict how Delaware’s 
highest court would rule on the issue if given the chance.117  To do this, the 
court was required to consider (1) statements by the Delaware Supreme Court 
in related areas, (2) cases decided by Delaware’s intermediate courts, (3) 
federal court cases interpreting Delaware law, and (4) decisions from other 
jurisdictions discussing the issue.118  Because the first two categories yielded 
no helpful authority, the court turned to federal cases analyzing state law, and 
thus, to Lafferty.119  The Exide Technologies court cited and quoted Lafferty at 
length in analyzing the plaintiffs’ deepening insolvency claim: 
The Court of Appeals held that three factors “would persuade the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court to recognize ‘deepening insolvency’” as giving rise to a 
cognizable injury in the proper circumstances.  Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 352.  
These factors were the: (1) soundness of the theory; (2) growing acceptance of 
the theory among courts; and (3) remedial theme in Pennsylvania law (when 
there is an injury).  Id.  The Court found that the theory of deepening 
insolvency, particularly in the bankruptcy context, was a sound one.  Id. at 
349–50. Furthermore, the Court found that the “[g]rowing acceptance of the 
deepening insolvency theory confirms its soundness.”  Id. at 350.  The Court 
then cited numerous cases in which deepening insolvency was found to give 
rise to a cognizable injury.  Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 350–51.  Finally, the court 
determined that “one of the most venerable principles in Pennsylvania 
jurisprudence, and in most common law jurisdictions for that matter is that, 
where there is an injury, the law provides a remedy.”  Id. at 351.120 
The court reasoned based on Lafferty that the first two elements, i.e., the 
soundness of deepening insolvency theory and its growing judicial acceptance, 
had been met.121  As for the third element, being the remedial theme of the 
forum state’s law, the court observed that the Delaware Supreme Court had 
stated that “the function of a damage award in civil litigation is to provide just 
and full compensation to a plaintiff who suffers injury or loss by reason of the 
conduct of the tortfeasor.”122  The court thus concluded, based on Lafferty and 
Delaware’s remedial scheme, that the Delaware Supreme Court would 
recognize a claim for deepening insolvency where there is damage to corporate 
property.123  With respect to the defendants’ remaining arguments for 
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dismissal, the court stated that the plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded their 
deepening insolvency claim, leaving the other issues for another day.124 
Exide Technologies is not at all persuasive.  Although it may have been 
true at the time the case was decided that some courts recognized deepening 
insolvency as an independent cause of action, what about those that did not?125  
What about courts that had recognized deepening insolvency only as a 
damages theory?126  The Exide Technologies court stated that the Lafferty court 
“cited numerous cases in which deepening insolvency was found to give rise to 
a cognizable injury,”127 but of the seven cases the Lafferty court cited, three 
recognized only that deepening insolvency is a theory of damages, and another 
three involved New York law.128  “No reported New York case, however, has 
ruled that ‘deepening insolvency’ is an independent tort.”129  How then did the 
cases cited in Lafferty compel the conclusion that the Delaware Supreme Court 
would recognize deepening insolvency as an independent cause of action?  
Given that the court was being called on to predict Delaware law, it should 
have analyzed the decision in Lafferty as well as the cases the Third Circuit 
cited; the Exide Technologies court specifically noted that in predicting 
Delaware law it was required to “examine” decisions from other jurisdictions 
discussing deepening insolvency.130  The term “examine” does not mean “read 
uncritically” or “acknowledge and ignore,” nor in this context does it suggest 
that a court should read only one case from another jurisdiction. 
The Lafferty court was predicting Pennsylvania law; the Exide 
Technologies court, being asked to predict Delaware law, was not obliged to 
follow Lafferty simply because it was decided by the highest court in the same 
judicial circuit.  Indeed, because the court was predicting Delaware law, 
special analytical care was in order. 
The Exide Technologies court’s embrace of Delaware’s remedial scheme, 
like the Lafferty court’s embrace of Pennsylvania’s remedial scheme, should 
have caused the court to conclude that the plaintiffs’ deepening insolvency 
claim was at most a theory of damages.  The Delaware Supreme Court’s 
statement that “the function of a damage award in civil litigation is to provide 
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full and just compensation to a plaintiff who suffers injury or loss by reason of 
the conduct of the tortfeasor” cannot be read to license the recognition of a 
new cause of action, especially where the plaintiffs had pleaded eleven other 
causes of action arising out of the same factual nucleus.131  Exide Technologies 
is in all pertinent respects an analytical mess. 
C. Rejecting Deepening Insolvency Theory 
The best analysis of deepening insolvency theory is found in Kittay v. 
Atlantic Bank of New York (In re Global Service Group LLC),132 decided under 
New York law.  In that case, Global Service Group filed for bankruptcy.  The 
bankruptcy trustee then sued Global’s insiders (the Goldmans and Cohen) and 
Atlantic Bank.  The trustee alleged that Global was insolvent, or nearly so, and 
was undercapitalized from the time of its formation.133  The trustee further 
alleged that Atlantic Bank knew, or should have known, of Global’s condition 
but loaned it money anyway based on “its relationship with the Goldmans and 
the strength of their personal assets.”134  Atlantic Bank’s willingness to extend 
credit to Global influenced other creditors to do likewise.135  Long story short, 
by extending credit to Global, Atlantic Bank allowed it to “prolong its 
corporate existence and incur increased debt.”136 
Similarly, the trustee alleged that the Goldmans and Cohen allowed Global 
to do business while it was insolvent and undercapitalized.137  By prolonging 
Global’s existence and continuing to incur debt, they deepened the company’s 
insolvency and reduced creditors’ potential recovery from the bankruptcy 
estate.138  The trustee alleged that the “expansion of Global’s debt was the 
proximate cause of damage to Global and its creditors.”139 
The defendants moved to dismiss the trustee’s complaint.  One of the 
issues was the trustee’s cause of action for deepening insolvency, which the 
court described as “‘fraudulent prolongation of a corporation’s life beyond 
insolvency,’ resulting in damage to the corporation caused by increased 
debt.”140  The court carefully analyzed whether deepening insolvency should 
be treated as a theory of damages or as an independent cause of action,141 
noting in the process that New York case law suggested that deepening 
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insolvency was a theory of damages resulting from the commission of a 
separate tort, and observing that no reported New York decision had ever 
suggested that deepening insolvency was an independent tort.142  In any event, 
[t]he distinction between “deepening insolvency” as a tort or damage theory 
may be one unnecessary to make.  Prolonging an insolvent corporation’s life, 
without more, will not result in liability under either approach.  Instead, one 
seeking to recover for “deepening insolvency” must show that the defendant 
prolonged the company’s life in breach of a separate duty, or committed an 
actionable tort that contributed to the continued operation of a corporation and 
its increased debt.143 
Against this backdrop, the trustee’s deepening insolvency cause of action 
fell short.  The fact that Atlantic Bank made a loan to Global that it knew or 
should have known the company could not repay may have been bad banking, 
but it was not a tort.144  Lenders are not prohibited from extending credit to 
insolvent companies; were that the case, most insolvent companies would be 
forced to liquidate.145  As for the fact that Atlantic Bank loaned money to 
Global based “on the strength of its relationship with the Goldmans and their 
personal assets,” that was “neither surprising nor improper.”146  Banks prefer to 
lend money to people they know, and they routinely insist on personal 
guarantees and pledges of personal funds.147  Importantly, the trustee did not 
allege that Atlantic Bank loaned money to Global for the purpose of allowing 
the Goldmans to “siphon off” those funds or to engage in other wrongdoing.148 
“The unspoken premise of the trustee’s ‘deepening insolvency’ theory 
[was] that the managers of an insolvent” company have an “absolute duty” to 
liquidate it, and that “anyone who knowingly extends credit to the insolvent 
company breaches an independent duty in the nature of aiding and abetting the 
managers’ wrongdoing.”149  This is a flawed assumption, as the In re Global 
Service Group court properly noted.150 
The directors and officers of a corporation owe fiduciary duties to both the 
corporation and its shareholders.151  Once the corporation becomes insolvent, 
their duties extend to creditors.152  At that point, “the directors and officers owe 
duties to multiple constituencies whose interests may diverge,” and they are 
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obligated to all concerned to act in good faith to maximize the corporation’s 
long-term capacity for creating wealth.153  As a result, 
[t]he fiduciaries of an insolvent business might well conclude that the company 
should continue to operate in order to maximize its “long-term wealth creating 
capacity,” or more generally, its enterprise value.  In fact, chapter 11 [of the 
Bankruptcy Code] is based on the accepted notion that a business is worth 
more to everyone alive than dead. . . . [T]here is no absolute duty . . . to shut 
down and liquidate an insolvent corporation.  The fiduciaries may, consistent 
with the business judgment rule, continue to operate the corporation’s 
business.154 
In short, directors’ and officers’ negligent but good faith decision to operate an 
insolvent business will not expose them to liability on a deepening insolvency 
theory.155 
To overcome the business judgment rule,156 a plaintiff must specifically 
allege that directors acted in bad faith or with fraudulent intent.157  Although 
the trustee alleged elsewhere in the complaint that the Goldmans were engaged 
in self-dealing, he did not allege that Global’s insiders prolonged the 
company’s existence to misappropriate loan proceeds.158  The trustee’s 
incorrect assumption that merely prolonging the existence of an insolvent 
corporation and thereby incurring additional debt and stating a claim for relief 
was fatal.159 
The In re Global Service Group court further noted that the trustee’s 
complaint failed to allege proximate cause.160  The trustee’s allegation that but 
for Atlantic Bank’s loans Global would have liquidated before its insolvency 
deepened was insufficient.161  The gravamen of the trustee’s case was that the 
Goldmans had received fraudulent transfers from Global and that they used 
some of the Atlantic Bank loan proceeds in their scheme.162  But while it 
arguably was foreseeable that the Atlantic Bank loans would permit Global to 
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Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
 157. In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 461. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 461. 
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continue doing business, there were no facts suggesting that Atlantic Bank 
could have foreseen that the Goldmans would misappropriate loan proceeds or 
operate their insolvent business for an improper purpose.163  The court 
therefore dismissed the trustee’s deepening insolvency claim.164 
In re Global Service Group is well reasoned and courts should follow it, as 
some already have.165  The court made several points worth remembering.  
First, “deepening insolvency” may be nothing more than a statement of 
corporate condition.166  The directors and officers of a company may have to 
operate through desperately lean times if the company is to recognize its long-
term financial potential.167  “A firm still can be economically viable even if it 
is insolvent.”168  This is well evidenced by the Bankruptcy Code itself, which 
permits bankrupt businesses to pursue rehabilitation (which necessarily entails 
deepening insolvency) rather than liquidating.169  Second, no matter how 
deepening insolvency theory may be described, it must be tempered by and 
subject to the business judgment rule.170  Courts following that rule uphold 
corporate directors’ decisions so long as they reflect rational business 
purposes.171  By logical extension, because a corporation’s lawyers are its 
agents,172 lawyers should not face liability on a deepening insolvency theory 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec Telecom, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
Fin. Coop. (In re Vartec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 641–46 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (finding 
that Supreme Court of Texas would not recognize deepening insolvency as a cause of action); 
Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, LLP, C.A. No. 1571-N, 2006 WL 2434228, at *28–
30 (Del. Ch. Aug. 10, 2006) (rejecting deepening insolvency as an independent cause of action 
and citing In re Global Services Group among other cases). 
 166. See In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 460 n.7. 
 167. See id. 
 168. Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of 
Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1498 (1993). 
 169. Bates, supra note 60, at 60; see also Elizabeth M. Bohn, Time to Reorganize: But How?, 
BUS. LAW TODAY, Mar./Apr. 2006, at 43, 44 (explaining that it is a core bankruptcy principle 
that preserving a business rather than liquidating it is usually in the best interests of the 
company’s creditors, employees, and business partners). 
 170. See In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 460. 
 171. Official Comm. of Subordinated Bondholders v. Integrated Res., Inc. (In re Integrated 
Res., Inc.), 147 B.R. 650, 656 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep’t 
Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)). 
 172. The attorney-client relationship is an agency relationship.  See, e.g., Wentland v. Wass, 
25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109, 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Schafer v. Berger, Kahn, Shafton, Moss, 
Figler, Simon & Gladstone, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)); Seaboard Sur. Co. v. 
Boney, 761 A.2d 985, 989, 992 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); Multilist Serv. of Cape Girardeau, 
Mo., Inc. v. Wilson, 14 S.W.3d 110, 114 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); Crane Creek Ranch, Inc. v. 
Cresap, 103 P.3d 535, 537 (Mont. 2004); Daniel v. Moore, 596 S.E.2d 465, 469 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2004) (quoting Johnson v. Amethyst Corp., 463 S.E.2d 397, 400 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995)); State ex 
rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Taylor, 4 P.3d 1242, 1253 n.39 (Okla. 2000); McBurney v. Roszkowski, 
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for assisting or implementing the legitimate business decisions of the directors 
and officers of an insolvent company.  Third, deepening insolvency theory 
should at most be considered to express a category or type of damages awarded 
only upon proof of a separate tort, typically a species of fraud or closely linked 
to fraudulent conduct.173 
II.  THE LEGAL VIABILITY OF DEEPENING INSOLVENCY CLAIMS 
When a deepening insolvency claim looms, the entity involved typically is 
in bankruptcy or receivership, and a trustee or receiver is administering the 
entity or its estate with a principal goal of maximizing its value.  Achieving 
this goal enhances the company’s chances to reorganize and operate 
successfully going forward or, at a minimum, increases disbursements to 
creditors and shareholders.  Consequently, trustees and receivers frequently 
scrutinize as a potential source of recovery the failed company’s fiduciaries, 
including lawyers who advised and assisted the company while it was in the 
zone of insolvency.174 
The issue here is whether and when deepening insolvency theory is a valid 
arrow in a trustee’s or receiver’s quiver.  Unlike claims for legal malpractice, 
breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting fraud or breach of fiduciary 
duty, deepening insolvency lacks the definition of elements essential to 
independent causes of action.175  Even as a damages theory, deepening 
insolvency generally suffers from unprovable causation and fatally imprecise 
elements.  For example, a company’s mere increase in debt is not an economic 
injury.176  Only if company insiders loot the new loan proceeds does the 
increased debt load become a damages factor, and even there the harm is 
attributable to the looting, not the borrowing.177  The fact that a company’s 
deepening insolvency may shake creditors’ confidence, and thus impair the 
company’s assets, is likewise no basis for assessing damages because 
deepening insolvency involves the fraudulent prolonging of an entity’s 
existence through the concealment of its true financial condition, meaning that 
“no one’s confidence will be shaken because no one knows that bankruptcy 
 
875 A.2d 428, 437 (R.I. 2005) (quoting State v. Cline, 405 A.2d 1192, 1199 (R.I. 1979)); Hill & 
Griffith Co. v. Bryant, 139 S.W.3d 688, 696 (Tex. App. 2004). 
 173. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec Telecom, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. 
(In re Vartec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 644 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005). 
 174. See Brighton, supra note 13, at 34 (noting that deepening insolvency claims are 
commonly asserted against an insolvent company’s accountants, investment advisers, and 
lawyers); J.B. Heaton, Deepening Insolvency, 30 J. CORP. L. 465, 470 (2005) (stating that a 
defunct corporation’s professional service firms often are “preferred targets” in litigation). 
 175. See In re Vartec Telecom, 335 B.R. at 645 (“If ‘deepening insolvency’ were a tort, what 
would its elements be?”). 
 176. Bates, supra note 60, at 60. 
 177. Id. 
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beckons.”178  Nonetheless, if it is anything other than a catch phrase, deepening 
insolvency is recognizable only as a limited theory of damages in narrow 
circumstances. 
A. Deepening Insolvency Should Be Judicially Recognized Only in Limited 
Circumstances 
In the face of severe financial challenges, corporate fiduciaries must strive 
to maximize a company’s “economic value.”179  To this end, corporate 
directors and officers often undertake, with the assistance of lawyers and other 
professionals, efforts intended—but not ensured—to increase revenue and to 
enhance assets or reduce liabilities.  But no matter how well planned or well 
intentioned, such efforts are inevitably risk-laden.180  Even the most carefully 
designed and executed efforts carry the very real possibility that the endeavor 
may fail.  When that occurs, the company may be deeper in debt; it may 
experience decreased profitability and value; it may be faced with additional 
expenses; it may be constrained by operational limitations; and it may suffer 
strained relationships with creditors, customers, lenders and other outsiders 
critical to its business.  Even when such risks materialize, however, they do not 
necessarily evidence corporate malfeasance for which those acting on the 
company’s behalf or counseling it should be liable. 
It is only where corporate fiduciaries and the outside professionals 
assisting them have acted fraudulently to plunge the company further into 
insolvency in breach of their fiduciary duties that deepening insolvency theory 
may properly attach.181  Bad faith, personal benefit, and complicity with 
culpable corporate fiduciaries are indispensable requirements.  Otherwise, 
lawyers, their corporate clients’ officers and directors, and other professionals 
may believe that liquidation is the only safe alternative for a company facing 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. Prod. Res. Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 791 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 180. Courts fashioned the business judgment rule to address precisely this hazard, as it 
recognizes the need for corporate officers and directors to take reasoned risks to promote a 
company’s interest in the absence of perfect certainty as to the potential success of the effort.  See 
Official Comm. of Subordinated Bondholders v. Integrated Res., Inc. (In re Integrated Res., Inc.), 
147 B.R. 650, 656 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 
(Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
 181. A useful example of the limited conduct that should be actionable and incorporate 
deepening insolvency as a theory of damages may be found in Production Resources Group, LLC 
v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004). There, the defendant allegedly diverted funds 
to favor a particular creditor related to the company’s insiders.  Id. at 780.  Although the company 
continued to operate and pay hefty salaries to insiders, it claimed to be insolvent, refused to hold 
an annual meeting, and issued shares to raise capital outside avenues permitted by the SEC.  Id. at 
774–81.  While this case did not involve outside professionals, it arguably models the type of 
conflict-of-interest laden conduct suitable for damages based on deepening insolvency theory. 
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severe financial challenges.182  To retain lawyers’ incentives to provide the 
expertise that distressed companies require, any rational liability regime must 
not punish bona fide attempts to salvage value. 
A claim for deepening insolvency must not serve as a vehicle for a 20/20 
hindsight evaluation of either the prudence of corporate decision-making or the 
ultimate perfection of legal advice given a corporate client.  Instead, a 
deepening insolvency claim must be sustainable only on the recognition that a 
“fraudulent and concealed incurrence of debt can damage [corporate] 
value . . . .”183  Only such fraud-based requirements184 duly recognize the 
delicate tensions facing corporate fiduciaries and counsel attempting to steer a 
company out of rough financial waters.  Only such limited availability of 
deepening insolvency theory can ensure that proper incentives exist to 
encourage qualified lawyers to continue to provide their expert services in a 
manner that is truly in the organizational client’s best interests. 
B. An Independent Deepening Insolvency Claim Adds Nothing 
Deepening insolvency is an increasingly popular cause of action.  But on 
close scrutiny, deepening insolvency theory—lacking any definition—adds 
nothing to the gallery of established torts that have traditionally played 
important roles in holding professionals and other corporate fiduciaries 
responsible for fraudulent conduct.185  For this simple reason alone, efforts to 
establish a deepening insolvency cause of action should cease.186 
 
 182. See Jay R. Bender, Deepening Insolvency in Alabama: Is It A Tort, A Damages Theory 
or Neither of the Above?, 66 ALA. LAW. 190, 198–99 (2005) (explaining that recognizing 
deepening insolvency as a cause of action or damage theory is bad policy because it deters 
legitimate corporate restructurings, discourages banks from entering into consensual workout 
agreements, and, thus, encourages premature business liquidations). 
 183. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 349 (3d 
Cir. 2001). 
 184. See Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assocs., P.C. (In re CitxX Corp.), 448 F.3d 672, 680–
81 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that negligence will not support a deepening insolvency cause of 
action; fraud is required); OHC Liquidation Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Oakwood 
Homes Corp.), 340 B.R. 510, 534 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (“The plaintiff, therefore, is required to 
show fraudulent conduct—not mere negligence.”); Nisselson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Monahan 
Ford Corp. of Flushing), 340 B.R. 1, 39–40 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining that deepening 
insolvency theory is based on fraud); Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP (In re Student Fin. 
Corp.), 335 B.R. 539, 548 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (“In order to state a claim for deepening 
insolvency, then, the trustee of a bankrupt debtor must allege that the defendant defrauded the 
debtor.”); Miller v. Dutil (In re Total Containment, Inc.), 335 B.R. 589, 620 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
2005); see also Devon Mobile Commc’ns Liquidating Trust v. Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. (In re 
Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.), 324 B.R. 492, 501 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (recognizing that a valid 
claim for deepening insolvency requires that the defendant have “wrongfully” prolonged the life 
of the now-insolvent entity). 
 185. See, e.g., Bondi v. Grant Thornton Int’l (In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.), 377 F. Supp. 2d 390, 
419 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing deepening insolvency claims against accounting firms as 
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The duplicative nature, and thus worthlessness, of deepening insolvency 
theory is illustrated by the decision in Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater S.E. Cmty. 
Hosp. Corp.).187  In that adversary action against a defunct corporation’s 
officers and directors and its former law firms, Epstein, Becker & Green and 
Kutak Rock, LLP, the court rejected deepening insolvency as a tort cause of 
action on the ground that it duplicates several recognized causes of action, 
including breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary 
duty, and legal malpractice.188  “There is no point in recognizing and 
adjudicating ‘new’ causes of action,” the court correctly reasoned, “when 
established ones cover the same ground.”189  Similarly, a bankruptcy court in 
Texas rejected deepening insolvency as a cause of action because it is 
“substantially duplicated by torts already established in Texas.”190 
1. Legal Malpractice and Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims Sufficiently 
Police the Attorney-Client Relationship 
When a lawyer fails to properly exercise her duty of care to the client and 
that failure leads to the client’s injury, the lawyer may be liable for 
malpractice.  In general, a claim for legal malpractice requires: (1) an attorney-
client relationship giving rise to a duty; (2) a violation or breach of duty by the 
attorney; (3) a breach of duty as a proximate cause of injury to the client; and 
(4) actual injury, loss or damage sustained by the client.191 
In addition to being obligated to conduct themselves in a competent and 
diligent manner reasonably calculated to promote the client’s interests—
obligations enforceable via a legal malpractice claim—lawyers also owe 
certain fiduciary duties to their clients, the violation of which may give rise to 
 
duplicating malpractice claims); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec Telecom, Inc. 
v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. (In re Vartec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 644 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) 
(finding that Texas would not recognize deepening insolvency as an independent tort “because 
the injury caused by the deepening of a corporation’s insolvency is substantially duplicated by 
torts already established . . .”). 
 186. Courts have declined to allow causes of action that are mere “disguises” of one another 
to proceed.  See Gen. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Jordan, Coyne & Savits, LLP, 357 F. Supp. 2d 951, 961–62 
(E.D. Va. 2005). 
 187. Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater S.E. Cmty. Hosp.), 333 B.R. 506 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2005). 
 188. Id. at 516–17. 
 189. Id. at 517. 
 190. In re Vartec Telecom, Inc., 335 B.R. at 644 (footnote omitted). 
 191. See Spur Prods. Corp. v. Stoel Rives, LLP, 122 P.3d 300, 303 (Idaho 2005) (quoting 
Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 96 P.3d 623, 627 (Idaho 2004)); N. Ill. Emergency Physicians v. 
Landau, Omahana & Kopka, Ltd., 837 N.E.2d 99, 106 (Ill. 2005); Stephens v. Denison, 150 
S.W.3d 80, 81 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004); Jerry’s Enters., Inc. v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, 
Ltd., 691 N.W.2d 484, 491 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); Kahn v. Morse & Mowbray, 117 P.3d 227, 
236 n.16 (Nev. 2005); Tolpo v. Decordova, 146 S.W.3d 678, 682 (Tex. App. 2004); Cox v. 
Geary, 624 S.E.2d 16, 22 (Va. 2006) (quoting Rutter v. Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, P.C., 
568 S.E.2d 693, 695 (Va. 2002)). 
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liability.192  Lawyers must maintain client confidences and property, avoid 
impermissible conflicts of interest, deal honestly with the client, and refrain 
from taking advantage of information in a manner adverse to the client.193  In 
short, lawyers owe their clients two basic fiduciary obligations: confidentiality 
and undivided loyalty.194  Where a claim for breach of fiduciary duty exists 
independently of a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff attempting to recover 
must prove: (1) there existed a lawyer-client relationship such that the lawyer 
was acting as a fiduciary for the client; (2) the lawyer breached a fiduciary 
duty to the client; (3) the client incurred injury; and (4) the lawyer’s breach of 
fiduciary duty was the proximate cause of the client’s injury.195  As a result, a 
lawyer’s liability will turn on a particularized showing that he engaged in bad-
faith, fraudulent, and self-enriching dealings at the client’s expense.196 
A legally cognizable deepening insolvency claim, properly analyzed, 
would require proof that the lawyer acted in a fraudulent manner or engaged in 
other misconduct in violation of the lawyer’s professional duties to the 
corporate client, and that this conduct proximately caused an increase in the 
client’s indebtedness.197  Recovery would further require that the increased 
debt constituted an actual, ascertainable injury to the client.198  Although 
labeled differently, a deepening insolvency claim equates with claims for legal 
malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty.  Efforts to prosecute a deepening 
insolvency claim against lawyers would thus necessarily turn on these same 
showings, although no court has so clearly defined such a claim. 
2. Deepening Insolvency Claims Are Likewise Redundant of Aiding and 
Abetting Claims 
Similarly, an independent claim for deepening insolvency asserted against 
a lawyer by a third party is indistinguishable from a claim for aiding and 
abetting fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, or other misconduct by a 
 
 192. See generally 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §§ 
14.1, 14.2 (2005) (discussing lawyers’ fiduciary duties and cause of action for their breach). 
 193. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 16, 50, 52 (2000) 
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
 194. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 192, § 14.1 at 485. 
 195. See, e.g., Chem-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, 772 (S.D. 2002); Bennett v. 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 70 P.3d 17, 27 (Utah 2003). 
 196. See Prod. Res. Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 780–81 (Del. Ch. 2004) 
(discussing the fraud-based threshold that directorial conduct must surpass in order for breach of 
fiduciary duty claims against directors to survive). 
 197. Kittay v. Atl. Bank of N.Y. (In re Global Serv. Group, LLC), 316 B.R. 451, 458–59 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 198. See Corp. Aviation Concepts, Inc. v. Multi-Service Aviation Corp., No. Civ.A. 03-3020, 
2004 WL 1900001, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2004). 
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corporation’s officers and directors.199  Claims against lawyers for aiding and 
abetting the tortious conduct of corporate fiduciaries200 are equally premised 
on a lawyer’s bad faith conduct.201  Aiding and abetting claims effectively 
charge lawyers with knowingly participating in primary violators’ tortious 
acts.202  For aiding and abetting liability to attach, there must be some violation 
by a corporate fiduciary.  A plaintiff must also demonstrate that the lawyer had 
 
 199. See Bondi v. Bank of Am. Corp. (In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.), 383 F. Supp. 2d 587, 602 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (declining to recognize deepening insolvency as an independent tort under North 
Carolina law because “North Carolina already imposes on every person a duty not to aid and abet 
a breach of fiduciary duty by another”); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec 
Telecom, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. (In re Vartec Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 641–46 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (rejecting deepening insolvency theory as duplicating established torts); 
In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 461–62 (discussing overlap between trustee’s deepening 
insolvency and aiding and abetting claims, and dismissing aiding and abetting claim). 
 200. An officer or director’s fiduciary duties to the corporation include good faith, due care, 
and loyalty.  McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 917 (Del. 2000); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 
10 (Del. 1998); see 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) (1994). The duty of good faith may be breached if an officer 
engages in knowingly illegal conduct that exposes the corporation to harm.  In re Caremark Int’l 
Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 966–70 (Del. Ch. 1996); see also 2 AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.31 at 8-200–201 (3d ed. Supp. 2005).  The duty of care may be 
breached if an officer fails to consider all material information reasonably available in the course 
of making a decision.  Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000).  The duty of loyalty 
prevents an officer from deriving an improper personal benefit at the company’s expense through 
self-dealing.  Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Del. 
1988). 
 201. A claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is not available in all 
jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Sherwood Partners, Inc., 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
325, 341 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (discussing California civil conspiracy law).  In addition, under the 
Wagoner doctrine, an officer’s wrongful conduct is imputed to a corporation, in which case the 
corporation will either lack standing to bring an aiding and abetting claim against a third party, or 
the corporation’s assertion of such a claim will be subject to the defense that the corporation is in 
pari delicto.  See Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 117–20 (2d Cir. 
1991); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. Investcorp S.A., 80 F. Supp. 
2d 129, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  There are two recognized exceptions to the Wagoner rule: (1) 
where the officers of the corporation acted with an adverse interest to the corporation, abandoning 
the interests of the company; or (2) where there was an innocent decision-maker within the debtor 
corporation that could have prevented the misconduct of the officers and directors.  See Smith v. 
Andersen LLP, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1199–1200 (D. Ariz. 2001).  Under these circumstances, a 
claim against a lawyer for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty would be viable.  Id. at 
1200. 
 202. See, e.g., Anstine v. Alexander, 128 P.3d 249, 255–56 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) (alleging 
that lawyer aided and abetted breach of fiduciary duty by company president); Thornwood, Inc. v. 
Jenner & Block, 799 N.E.2d 756, 768–69 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (alleging that lawyers aided and 
abetted breach of fiduciary duty by partner); Exposition Partner, LLP v. King, LeBlanc & Bland, 
LLP, 869 So. 2d 934, 942–44 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (aiding and abetting fraud); Chem-Age Indus., 
Inc. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, 773–76 (S.D. 2002) (alleging that lawyer aided and abetted 
breach of fiduciary duty). 
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actual knowledge of the wrongful conduct and provided substantial 
assistance203 in furtherance of that conduct.204  Such strict evidentiary 
requisites are both necessary and appropriate for potential liability to attach in 
the absence of an attorney-client relationship.  Prosecution of an independent 
claim based on deepening insolvency theory can require no less. 
Consequently, recognizing deepening insolvency as an independent cause 
of action only litters established tort law with a poorly-defined, redundant 
cause of action.205  Some might argue that this redundancy is harmless.  In fact, 
the harm is immediate and expensive both in terms of actual costs incurred in 
either prosecuting or defending such a claim, and in terms of the social and 
judicial costs. 
C. The Business Judgment Rule as a Valid Defense Against Deepening 
Insolvency Claims 
Whether deepening insolvency is asserted as an independent cause of 
action or as a damage theory, lawyers defending against such allegations must 
be permitted a business judgment rule defense.  Based on the very nature of 
their roles as counselors and advisors, lawyers will not have made the business 
decisions or exercised the business judgment that occasioned the company’s 
failure.  Lawyers are their clients’ agents; it is their responsibility to carry out 
their clients’ lawful instructions, not to chart their own course.  Yet, those 
business decisions—rather than merely the lawyers’ conduct—are at the center 
of the evidence that must be litigated.  The business judgment rule forces 
plaintiffs attacking corporate decisions to address the manner in which they 
were made, rather than whether they proved to be correct.  The business 
judgment rule also requires plaintiffs to overcome a strong presumption against 
second-guessing the decisions made.  As a consequence, the rule can be a 
robust tool in providing counsel assisting insolvent companies with the 
 
 203. See Kolbeck v. LIT Am., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 240, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  This substantial 
assistance requirement implicitly incorporates an element of causation, requiring a showing that 
the aiding and abetting conduct “proximately caused the harm on which the primary liability is 
predicated.”  Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 452, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 204. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979). 
 205. See Bondi v. Bank of Am. Corp. (In re Pamalat Sec. Litig.), 383 F. Supp. 2d 587, 601–
02 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing deepening insolvency claim as duplicative of breach of fiduciary 
duty claim); Alberts v. Tuft (In re Greater S.E. Cmty. Hosp. Corp.), 333 B.R. 506, 517 (Bankr. 
D.D.C. 2005) (discussing deepening insolvency, the court reasoned that “[t]here is no point in 
recognizing and adjudicating ‘new’ causes of action when established ones cover the same 
ground”); Rafool v. Goldfarb Corp. (In re Fleming Packaging Corp.), No. 03-82408, 04-8166, 
2005 WL 2205703, at *10 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2005) (noting that directors’ fiduciary duties 
clearly prohibit the type of conduct on which deepening insolvency claims are based); Official 
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Vartec Telecom, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Fin. Coop. (In re Vartec 
Telecom, Inc.), 335 B.R. 631, 644 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (rejecting deepening insolvency 
theory as duplicative of established torts). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
154 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:127 
freedom needed to act in furtherance of companies’ best interests.206  This is 
true even when decisions or selected courses of action may be deemed risky or 
outside the bounds of traditionally accepted conduct.207 
To conform a lawyer’s standard of conduct to that which exists for 
purposes of legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims, the business 
judgment rule must be a defense to deepening insolvency claims.  Recognizing 
this defense better mitigates the risks lawyers face and provides the proper 
incentives for lawyers to assist financially distressed companies. 
The business judgment rule manifests the basic tenet of corporate law that 
corporate officers and directors must prudently manage the company’s affairs, 
but they are not obligated to avoid all risks.  Indeed, a “principal justification” 
for the rule is to “cause corporations to take on business risks.”208  
Accordingly, the rule creates a presumption that “in making business decisions 
not involving direct self-interest or self-dealing, corporate directors act on an 
informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that their actions are in 
the corporation’s best interest.”209  The rule safeguards directors and officers 
from liability when certain corporate decisions turn out to be unprofitable or 
harmful, 
unless the directors are interested or lack independence relative to the decision, 
do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational 
business purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process that 
includes the failure to consider all material facts reasonably available.210 
Corporate decisions carried out by a fiduciary within her corporate authority, 
in good faith, with due care,211 and for a rational business purpose212 cannot 
 
 206. See 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF 
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 18–19 (5th ed. 1998). 
 207. Id. at 84–85 (discussing the abuse of discretion standard which provides “broad latitude” 
to directors). 
 208. Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate Officers and the Business 
Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865, 870 (2005) (discussing Prof. 
Lyman P.Q. Johnson’s recognition of a principal justification for the business judgment rule). 
 209. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 212 (8th ed. 2004).  Delaware courts, frequently the forum 
for significant corporate litigation, recognize that a decision by a board of directors (1) in which 
the directors possess no direct or indirect personal interest, (2) that is made (a) with reasonable 
awareness of all reasonably available material information and (b) after prudent consideration of 
the alternatives, and (3) which is in good faith furtherance of a rational corporate purpose, will 
not be interfered with by the courts, either prospectively by injunction or retrospectively by 
imposition of liability for damages upon the directors, even if the decision appears to have been 
unwise or have caused loss to the corporation or its stockholders.  See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. 
NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927–28 (Del. 2003); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 
85, 90–91 (Del. 2001); McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916–17 (Del. 2000). 
 210. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000). 
 211. The business judgment rule focuses the duty of care analysis of a business decision 
primarily on the process by which the decision was reached; that is, whether the defendants 
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thus be questioned with hindsight for liability purposes.  This fact was recently 
underscored in a deepening insolvency case filed against bankers and various 
managers of a bankrupt corporation, where the court noted that under the 
business judgment rule, “a manager’s negligent but good faith decision to 
operate an insolvent business will not subject him to liability for ‘deepening 
insolvency.’”213 
Where a plaintiff successfully rebuts the presumption set forth in the 
business judgment rule by showing that the corporate decision was not made 
with due care, in good faith, or with a rational business purpose, the judicial 
deference permitted to the fiduciary dissolves.  The burden shifts to the 
fiduciary to prove the fairness of the challenged decision.214 
The same presumptive protections supplied by the business judgment rule 
must play a role in deepening insolvency litigation against lawyers, as the rule 
recognizes “that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate 
corporate business decisions.”215  The role of a lawyer assisting an insolvent 
corporation is to promote the corporation’s best interests within the limits of 
the lawyer’s engagement.  In doing so, a lawyer is forced to give advice and 
make recommendations based on less-than-perfect information and must often 
do so urgently.  In these circumstances, the lawyer’s role is to provide prudent 
and reasoned advice that promotes the corporation’s interests, whether those 
interests are best served by bankruptcy or by entering into risk-laden ventures 
that may prove beneficial to the company.216  Where corporate fiduciaries that 
 
considered all material information reasonably available.  The rule deflects attention away from 
the substance of the decision itself (e.g., whether a reasonably careful or risk free course of action 
was selected), thereby imposing a control for hindsight bias.  See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 
(“Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments.  We do not even decide if they 
are reasonable in this context.  Due care in the decision-making context is process due care 
only.”).  In other words, where the business judgment rule applies, the duty of care may be 
characterized as simply a duty to exercise informed business judgment.  In some jurisdictions, the 
adequacy of the decision-making process is measured by concepts of gross negligence.  See 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 212. Transactions designed to disguise a corporation’s insolvency so that it may continue to 
conduct business untainted would not constitute a legitimate business purpose.  See Amfesco 
Indus., Inc. v. Greenblatt, 568 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594–95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). 
 213. Kittay v. Atl. Bank of N.Y. (In re Global Serv. Group, LLC), 316 B.R. 451, 461 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 214. See Croton River Club, Inc. v. Half Moon Bay Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. (In re Croton 
River Club), 52 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1995); Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 91; McMullin, 765 
A.2d at 917. 
 215. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982); see Prod. Res. Group, LLC v. NCT 
Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 794 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 216. If the business judgment rule is deemed inapplicable to deepening insolvency claims 
against lawyers, the effect is to impose on lawyers who advise companies in the zone of 
insolvency an absolute incentive to counsel in favor of liquidation.  There is no such duty under 
American law.  Instead, fiduciaries are obligated to make a good faith effort to maximize the 
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approve the advice provided by a lawyer before any action is taken are 
protected against liability for corporate harm caused by their own mistakes of 
judgment, the lawyer providing the advice deserves the same protection.  The 
lawyer cannot be left to suffer as the scapegoat.  The business judgment rule 
would not preclude recovery where a lawyer advising a corporation conducts 
herself in a fraudulent or self-interested manner.217  Application of the rule, 
however, would better refine any valid theory of liability or recovery to impose 
liability on truly culpable counsel rather than punishing counsel for their mere 
inability to predict the future. 
Essential to any analysis of whether lawyers deserve business judgment 
rule protection is an understanding of the contours of lawyers’ duties when 
representing a company in the zone of insolvency.  Like corporate officers and 
directors, lawyers may never be judged by whether their conduct, decisions, or 
advice met some intangible standard of perfection or absolute correctness.  
Instead, and again like corporate officers and directors, lawyers are required to 
conform their conduct so that it does not fall below a certain standard of care, 
as reflected by the care and diligence exercised in settling on the conduct, 
decisions, or advice at issue.  Accordingly, deepening insolvency claims 
against lawyers masquerade as malpractice claims attacking the underlying 
business decisions affected by the lawyers’ conduct, decisions, or advice.  
Indeed, deepening insolvency claims against lawyers often are made when 
corporate officers and directors are for some reason judgment-proof.  
Deepening insolvency theory thus extends lawyers’ liability to business 
decisions, even in the absence of the decision makers. 
As a result, lawyers should receive the same business judgment rule shelter 
that corporate officers and directors receive, so long as the lawyers’ advice, 
conduct, or decisions reflect honest and reasoned analysis, rather than 
dishonesty and self-dealing.  There is no reason to distinguish between a 
company’s leaders and its lawyers in the deepening insolvency context. 
Fairly allocating liability for misconduct connected to a company’s 
deepening insolvency also requires recognizing that lawyers, like courts, do 
not make business decisions and are not positioned to second guess the 
business leaders who do.  This aversion to second-guessing is a central premise 
 
corporation’s long-term wealth-creating capacity.  In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. at 460 
(quoting Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 
1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991)).  Maximizing a corporation’s wealth-creating 
capacity may well entail taking current risks in favor of long-term growth.  In fact, this duty of 
corporate fiduciaries to salvage a corporation is written into bankruptcy law in the form of 
Chapter 11, whose construct is based on the concept that a business is more valuable alive than 
dead.  See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of RSL COM PRIMECALL, Inc. v. Beckhoff 
(In re RSL COM PRIMECALL, Inc.), Nos. 01–11457 through 01–11469(ALG), 2003 WL 
22989669, at *8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2003). 
 217. See In re RSL COM PRIMECALL, 2003 WL 22989669, at *9–10. 
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for the business judgment rule.  In addition, if deepening insolvency theory is 
intended to penalize lawyers for fraudulently prolonging a company’s life, then 
lawyers are entitled to a corresponding framework for analyzing risks 
attending their advice.  The business judgment rule provides predictability.  
Insofar as lawyers go, the rule deters misconduct while minimizing artificial 
disincentives to entrepreneurial risk taking, to independent decision making, 
and to representing distressed clients in desperate need of good counsel. 
Application of the business judgment rule as a defense to a deepening 
insolvency claim allows courts to properly penalize attorney conduct on the 
fringes.  By better defining the lawyer liability regime, the relevant inquiries 
for plaintiffs and their counsel can have a more relevant and more precise 
focus.  For instance, where the business judgment rule plays a role, a 
deepening insolvency claim against a lawyer must be premised on a transaction 
that was arranged so improvidently and in such a risky, unusual, or 
unnecessary manner as to offend fundamental legal practices.  The query must 
turn on whether there existed any sound reasons for structuring and conducting 
the transaction as it was, thereby encouraging lawyers to provide well-reasoned 
and justifiable counsel to their clients. 
In addition, given that a corporation on the brink of insolvency may owe 
duties to groups that are both internally and comparatively diverse, such as 
shareholders and creditors,218 lawyers advising the corporation must be 
protected from these non-homogeneous interests where their advice was given 
in good faith, with due care, and in furtherance of a rational business purpose.  
The lack of such a shield hazards the imposition of contradicting duties on 
fiduciaries. 
D. The Necessity to Establish Causation Is a Significant Obstacle to the 
Thoughtful Application of Deepening Insolvency Theory 
A deepening insolvency claim effectively alleges that the lawyer 
participated in certain matters, failed to prevent the client from making certain 
business decisions, or failed to share particular information concerning the 
company’s financial condition with certain players.219  This conduct, according 
to typical allegations, assisted the allegedly culpable corporate fiduciaries in 
further depleting the client’s assets and driving it deeper into insolvency.220  It 
is plain that this theory suffers from a fatal inability to establish that the 
lawyer’s conduct proximately caused the corporation’s alleged injuries. 
 
 218. See Prod. Res. Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790 n.57 (Del. Ch. 
2004); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 
1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
 219. See, e.g., Complaint at 42–44, Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP (In re Student Fin. 
Corp.), 335 R.R. 539 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (No. 02-11620-JBR). 
 220. See, e.g., id. at 43. 
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Proximate cause is an essential element of all tort claims.  To demonstrate 
proximate cause, the “mere possibility of causation” is insufficient, and a 
plaintiff must “introduce evidence that allows for the reasonable conclusion 
that it is more likely than not that a defendant’s conduct was the cause of the 
injury.”221  Under the traditional conception of proximate causation, if the 
alleged injury would have occurred without the lawyer’s alleged misconduct, a 
plaintiff cannot show that the lawyer’s conduct proximately caused the 
injury.222 
By requiring proof that but for a defendant attorney’s malpractice a 
plaintiff would have experienced a more favorable outcome, the proximate 
cause element of legal malpractice theory prevents “speculative and 
conjectural claims” and “serves the essential purpose of ensuring that damages 
awarded for [an] attorney’s malpractice actually have been caused by the 
malpractice.”223  The importance of establishing proximate cause is heightened 
in a deepening insolvency case, where multiple factors surely contributed to 
the company’s downfall and the lawyers are convenient scapegoats for their 
client’s business misjudgments.224 
Given the many factors that combine to produce corporate success or 
failure, the notion that a corporation’s demise could have been averted or that 
its ultimate insolvency could have been materially lessened but for a lawyer’s 
alleged negligence generally defies logic.  Lawyers are not guarantors of their 
clients’ business judgment.  A lawyer does not have the ability to compel a 
company’s officers or directors to pursue a particular course of action.225  This 
fact alone will in most cases turn causation into speculation and thus defeat a 
plaintiff’s claim. 
The long and the short of it is that absent exceptional circumstances 
involving fraud or similar misconduct, a bankruptcy trustee or other 
representative of an insolvent entity will simply be unable to eliminate with 
sufficient certainty the effect of other factors contributing to the company’s 
 
 221. Pettigrew v. Citizens Trust Bank, 229 B.R. 39, 42 (N.D. Ga. 1998); see Holmes v. 
Peebles, 554 S.E.2d 566, 568 (Ga. App. 2001). 
 222. See Ogletree v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 535 S.E. 2d 545, 548 (Ga. App. 2000); 
Houston v. Surrett, 474 S.E.2d 39, 41 (Ga. App. 1996). 
 223. Viner v. Sweet, 70 P.3d 1046, 1052 (Cal. 2003). 
 224. See id. at 1051–52 (quoting John H. Bauman, Damages for Legal Malpractice: An 
Appraisal of the Crumbling Dike and Threatening Flood, 61 TEMPLE L. REV. 1127, 1154–55 
(1988)). 
 225. Cf. Drabkin v. Alexander Grant & Co., 905 F.2d 453, 455, 456–57 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(noting that single director lacked the ability to “effect a rescue or pull the plug” as struggling 
company attempted to deal with tax delinquency, such that bankruptcy trustee could not establish 
causation in action against accountants). 
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demise.226  Such additional factors may include economic conditions, 
competitive forces, governmental action, and fundamental aspects of the 
business at issue such as operating or production costs, financing costs, and the 
like.227  Of course, a lawyer cannot be held liable for injuries caused by other 
forces or the actions of others.228 
Thus, absent fraudulent conduct involving significant self-dealing, a 
lawyer’s advice concerning a particular transaction or business strategy simply 
cannot be the proximate cause of a company’s deepening insolvency.  In 
addition, unless no participant other than the lawyer knew of the corporation’s 
financial condition, or all other key decision-makers lacked substantial critical 
information, the plaintiff cannot show that a lawyer’s alleged misconduct 
specifically delayed the corporation’s decision to dissolve. 
Tort claims also carry an element of foreseeability.  The concept of 
foreseeability eliminates a defendant’s liability for damages that are remote, 
speculative, or unconnected to the alleged tort.229  To this end, certain conduct 
can be the proximate cause of injury if, by the exercise of reasonable care, the 
actor could have foreseen or anticipated that some injury might result.230  A 
defendant is not liable if “the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury are 
too remote for the law to countenance recovery.”231 
A plaintiff alleging deepening insolvency must therefore show that it was 
reasonably foreseeable to the lawyers that their services would result in losses 
of the type sustained.  So long as the facts do not evidence fraud, self-dealing, 
or conflicts of interest on the lawyers’ part, the evidence cannot lead to a 
rational conclusion that the lawyers should have foreseen that their advice 
 
 226. See id. at 455, 456–58 (observing that “[b]ad luck both at the company itself and in its 
market, and perhaps bad management, brought about the losses,” and ultimately rejecting 
trusteee’s claim). 
 227. Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57, 61–62 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(discussing trustee’s failure to demonstrate causation in securities fraud case); AUSA Life Ins. 
Co. v. Ernst & Young, 119 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing the many factors 
that accountants could not have anticipated that affected client’s business, including company’s 
unwise acquisition of a failing business, the fact that the company would be hit with a devastating 
price war, the fact that key executives would leave and that office costs and new store leases 
would soar, or that the company’s business would be harmed by a sharp drop in commercial 
construction). 
 228. See Hicks, M.D. v. Talbott Recovery Sys., Inc., 196 F.3d 1226, 1243 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(discussing intervening causes generally) (quoting Harrison v. Jenkins, 510 S.E.2d 345, 346 (Ga. 
App. 1998)); Drabkin, 905 F.2d at 457 (discussing trustee’s failure to establish causation); 
Walker v. Hammock, 541 S.E.2d 439, 441 (Ga. App. 2000) (explaining when intervening acts 
defeat causation). 
 229. See WM. LLOYD PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 43, at 280–81 (5th ed. 1984). 
 230. See Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1172, 1176–77 (D. Kan. 1992). 
 231. Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.A. v. Coleman, 398 S.E.2d 16, 17 (Ga. 
1990). 
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would lead the corporation deeper into debt.  In addition, foreseeability “turns 
on fairness, policy, and . . . a rough sense of justice.  A reasonably foreseeable 
act might well be regarded as an act that a reasonable person who knew 
everything that the defendant knew at the time would have been able to know 
in advance with a fair degree of probability.”232  When lawyers provide 
services, they do not guarantee success, but attempt only to contribute to the 
client’s chances of success.  Thus, lawyers acting in line with their ethical and 
professional mandates cannot be said to have foreseen an injury if the business 
fails. 
In short, to promote fairness and the needed incentives for appropriate 
legal and business ingenuity and risk-taking, foreseeability must be assessed in 
the pragmatic context of lawyers’ duties.  It is only when a lawyer acts outside 
these bounds that foreseeability may be proven.233 
E. Deepening Insolvency Theory Inherently Relies Upon Speculative 
Damages Allegations 
The causation and foreseeability problems that plague deepening 
insolvency claims lead to alleged damages that are speculative or remote and 
hence not recoverable.  A plaintiff may not recover for damages that are 
merely a possible result of an act, or that are traceable to the act but are not its 
legal or natural consequence.  Rather, a plaintiff may seek only those damages 
that she can prove to have been the legal and natural result of the act done.234 
The damages sought under deepening insolvency theory cannot meet this 
standard.  Such claims against lawyers cannot distinguish with credibility or 
the necessary level of certainty whether other factors caused the injury alleged 
or what portion of the injury was a direct result of the lawyers’ fraudulent 
conduct.  Likewise, any assertion that an absence of the conduct would have 
steered the corporation away from insolvency is speculative, as is any assertion 
that other opportunities or destructive events would not have come to pass 
even had the transaction at issue not occurred.  Speculation may not form the 
basis of a cognizable claim for damages. 
Furthermore, any damages calculation based on deepening insolvency 
relies on a multitude of inconstant variables and cannot be sufficiently specific.  
Again, “mere speculation of a loss resulting from an attorney’s alleged [acts 
 
 232. AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 217–18 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 233. See Lytle v. McClain, No. 03CA008400, 2004 WL 1932975, at *3–4 (Ohio App. Sept. 1, 
2004) (explaining that lawyer acted within accepted bounds of conduct and that damages 
resulting from client’s intervening conduct were not foreseeable for purposes of legal malpractice 
claim). 
 234. See Drabkin v. Alexander Grant & Co., 905 F.2d 453, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Resolution 
Trust Corp. v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, 853 F. Supp. 1422, 1427–29 (S.D. Fla. 1994); 
Stratton v. Miller, 113 B.R. 205, 210 (D. Md. 1989). 
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or] omissions is insufficient,”235 and courts cannot presume that alleged 
damages are attributable to lawyers’ conduct.236  Deepening insolvency theory 
rests on so many variables that are susceptible to “minute perturbations . . . 
[that] there is a universe of alternate positions with few constants.  Such 
alternative analysis . . . entails an inquiry into what the plaintiff would have 
done, with the slightest deviation in the particular hypothesized decision 
producing substantially different results.”237  A plaintiff cannot show with 
reasonable certainty that the corporation’s directors would have taken any one 
of a number of alternate courses that may or may not have spared the company 
additional indebtedness, either during the lawyers’ involvement with the 
company or after. 
Even assuming that a deepening insolvency claim was based on 
sufficiently specific and certain damage estimates, however, recovery must 
nonetheless be barred under traditional legal and equitable defenses.238  Any 
damage assessment is subject to all defenses available to defeat a direct claim, 
including in pari delicto, contributory and comparative negligence, assumption 
of risk, and apportionment of damages, among others.239  As lawyers cannot 
act to injure a corporation without cooperation and assistance from insiders, 
these defenses are unavoidable. 
VII.  BEST PRACTICES FOR LAWYERS IN A WORLD OF DEEPENING INSOLVENCY 
ALLEGATIONS 
Deepening insolvency, either as an independent claim or as a theory of 
damages, poses a significant hazard to all lawyers serving clients in the zone of 
insolvency so long as courts fail to scrutinize its shortcomings at the initial 
stages of litigation.  So what are lawyers who represent financially troubled 
 
 235. Luniewski v. Zeitlin, 591 N.Y.S.2d 524, 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); see, e.g., Resolution 
Trust Corp., 853 F. Supp. at 1428–29 (rejecting speculative damage claim); Pettigrew v. Citizens 
Trust Bank, 229 B.R. 39, 42 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (same). 
 236. N. Ill. Emergency Physicians v. Landau, Omahana & Kopka, Ltd., 837 N.E.2d 99, 107 
(Ill. 2005) (discussing legal malpractice actions). 
 237. Resolution Trust Corp., 853 F. Supp. at 1425 n.2. 
 238. See Terlecky v. Hurd (In re Dublin Sec., Inc.), 133 F.3d 377, 379–80 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(recognizing in pari delicto defense in action by bankruptcy trustee); Sender v. Buchanan (In re 
Hedged-Investments Assoc., Inc.), 84 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir. 1996) (same); Hirsch v. Arthur 
Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1093–94 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing lack of standing as a 
defense in trustee’s action against accountants). 
 239. See, e.g., Baena v. KPMG LLP, 389 F. Supp. 2d 112, 117–21 (D. Mass. 2005) 
(recognizing in pari delicto as a complete defense to a deepening insolvency claim); Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Nickless (In re Advanced RISC Corp.), 324 B.R. 10, 15–
16 (D. Mass. 2005) (recognizing in pari delicto as a complete defense to a deepening insolvency 
claim made by bankruptcy trustee); Miller v. Dutil (In re Total Containment, Inc.), 335 B.R. 589, 
620 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2005) (recognizing in pari delicto as a defense to a deepening insolvency 
claim made by bankruptcy trustee). 
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clients to do when it comes to shielding themselves and their firms against 
deepening insolvency allegations? 
Lawyers have been conditioned as to the perils of creating a paper trail 
when managing their own risk.  In this context, however, documenting 
interactions with business leaders and diligent follow-through on troublesome 
developments are critical to resisting misconduct allegations.  Lawyers must be 
especially careful to communicate to corporate clients all options for 
addressing a particular situation.  These communications must be documented 
accurately.  It falls upon counsel to reasonably anticipate issues that could 
foreseeably go awry and to ensure that corporate officers and directors know 
about and account for these possibilities in planning any course of action.  
Again, these forewarnings must be fair, informed, and reliable, and must be 
documented. 
Some commentators suggest that lawyers who document their advice face 
a conflict of interest because a bankruptcy trustee or examiner will use the 
lawyers’ letters, memoranda, etc., to hang the directors and officers who 
ignored the advice or who took contrary action.240  In other words, the lawyers 
are documenting their advice to the board or to the company’s officers not 
because it is in the company’s interest that they do so, but because it is in the 
lawyers’ personal interest to document their advice to minimize their potential 
liability.  In this way the lawyers’ personal interests are materially limiting 
their representation of the company, which is a conflict of interest.241  But that 
simply is not so.  The corporation’s officers and directors should be interested 
in acting lawfully, and the corporation’s lawyers should be interested in 
steering them that way.  The fact that officers and directors may disregard the 
lawyers’ advice does not mean that the lawyers’ acts of documenting their 
advice manifests a conflict of interest.  To the extent the lawyers’ advice itself 
is ultimately placed at issue, a trustee, examiner, or receiver can simply waive 
the corporation’s attorney-client privilege and depose company insiders or the 
lawyers about the advice.242 
In the same vein, lawyers must be mindful to provide advice and make 
decisions that predictably fall under the protective umbrella of the business 
judgment rule.  Defensive measures include appropriate documentation, 
encouraging detailed board minutes, attention to procedural formality and 
thoroughness, careful attention to requisite approvals from independent 
directors, and deliberated retention of independent advisors.  Moreover, 
 
 240. See Conaway, supra note 16 (“It is all these CYA memos by lawyers that make it easy 
for plaintiffs to tear these organizations apart.”). 
 241. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2004) (discussing conflicts of 
interest with current clients). 
 242. See Douglas R. Richmond, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Associated Confidentiality 
Concerns in the Post-Enron Era, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 381, 441–46 (2005) (discussing the 
ability of trustees, receivers, and liquidators to waive a corporation’s attorney-client privilege). 
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lawyers must be sensitive to signs of insider dealing, fraudulent conveyances, 
or the involvement of any relationships that risk appearing too close and hence 
not disinterested.  Because deepening insolvency charges implicitly accuse 
lawyers of aiding and abetting client misconduct, lawyers must act responsibly 
when signs of improper or fraudulent activity by corporate insiders appear.  
This may require lawyers to report up the ladder, withdraw from the 
representation, or take any number of other appropriate actions.  Feigned 
ignorance or willful blindness will not do. 
Lawyers can also take additional protective steps in advance of engaging a 
client to minimize the strength of a future trustee’s potential deepening 
insolvency claim against the lawyer.  Lawyers should review and analyze the 
corporate charter, bylaws, and employment agreements governing the 
employment terms and liabilities of the various directors and officers that are 
likely to be the primary decision makers.  In particular, lawyers should look for 
and encourage the inclusion in these documents of exculpation provisions, 
thwarting liability for directors and officers within certain parameters.  This 
strategy is particularly valuable because such provisions impede primary 
liability claims against directors and officers, and can therefore impede 
secondary liability claims against lawyers, to the extent that deepening 
insolvency claims effectively allege that a legal professional assisted a director 
or officer’s fraudulent conduct. 
Furthermore, lawyers can attempt to steer clear of deepening insolvency 
charges by being aware of the situations in which hindsight-driven bankruptcy 
trustees or receivers have an incentive to pursue lawyer liability claims.  For 
instance, where a company has inadequate directors’ and officers’ (D & O) 
liability insurance, a recovery-driven trustee or receiver is more likely to 
initiate claims against other actors who may, in the form of their malpractice 
insurance, carry with them funds that are more easily accessible.  Hence, 
lawyers are well-advised to ensure that their clients are covered by suitable D 
& O policies. 
An additional strategy may be to deepen the pool of defendants potentially 
available to a trustee.  To this end, lawyers should evaluate the benefits of 
strictly limiting their engagement to legal advice and of retaining independent, 
specialty professionals to fill the gaps of providing complementary, but non-
legal, advice.  Although this strategy may have its drawbacks, it may well 
function, at the end of a bad situation, to divert a plaintiff’s attention to other 
deep pockets. 
Unfortunately, where the client is distressed, claims against lawyers may 
devolve to an inquiry into whether the lawyer was sufficiently cautious, far-
sighted, and risk-averse.  Protecting against this reality compels lawyers to 
create a reliable and accurate record of what the client and its agents knew 
before choosing a certain course of action. 
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CONCLUSION 
Deepening insolvency theory poses greater costs than benefits.  There may, 
on the fringes, be some accuracy to the notion that a “corporation is not a 
biological entity for which it can be presumed that any act which extends its 
existence is beneficial to it.”243  This underlying logic is superficially appealing 
because it appears to create a subjective field in which lawyers and other 
corporate fiduciaries are compelled to assess the likely impact of their advice 
and actions rather than abiding by absolute duties which may be vulnerable to 
disclaimers and manipulation.  But this initial theoretical appeal disregards the 
practical implications of creating normative standards of conduct. 
The pragmatic consequence of deepening insolvency claims or damages 
against lawyers may well be that they will instill uncertainty and confusion in 
the standards for legal services to clients in the zone of insolvency.  The further 
and natural consequence is a significant disincentive to lawyers to pursue and 
advise in favor of all well-considered risks necessary to salvage a client on the 
brink of insolvency.  These consequences are all undesirable. 
 
 
 243. Bloor v. Dansker (In re Investors Funding Corp. of N.Y. Sec. Litig.), 523 F. Supp. 533, 
541 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
